Abstract. This paper examines a foreign technology holder's licensing choices between royalty and fixed-fee scheme. We emphasize that foreign licensor chooses the quality of licensed technology when the licensee country does not implement perfect intellectual property protection for licensor's technology. We study quality choice as the foreign licensor's selection for a particular grade of technical skills. We show that fixed fee emerges as the equilibrium licensing scheme when both the transfer of his technology is relatively efficient and the licensee is sufficiently cost competitive in the domestic market, and that royalty licensing prevails otherwise. We further show it need not hold the general belief that welfare in the licensor country unambiguously rise with a stronger patenting system in the licensee country when, in particular, such patenting system in place is sufficiently lax.
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Domestic Patenting Systems and Foreign Licensing Choices
Introduction
A patent allows the inventor for a certain period of time during which he is entitled to manage the diffusion of his invention. Patenting, therefore, serves as an incentive for innovation when, in particular, the inventor can reap the fruit of his investment in R&D. Generally, the innovator can realize a profit on the research outcome either from his filing for the patent or through the licensing of the patent. In the case of patent licensing, the most frequently observed types of contract include fixed fee, per unit royalty and/or a combination of fixed fee and royalties (see, for example, San Martin and Saracho, 2010; Vishwasrao, 2007) .
As a major seller of technology, the United States accounts for roughly 50% of world revenue of royalty and license fee (World Development Indicators, 2010) . The multinational corporations (MNC) with US origin have been the key channels of transfer for technical know-how, industrial processes and computer software.
Empirical evidence has shown that two-thirds of royalties and license receipts come from intra-firm transactions and approximately 60% of total trade within U.S.
multinationals trade in intermediate inputs (The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2004).
It is often believed that a weaker patenting 1 regime in the domestic country is harmful for the business interests of foreign innovative licensor. This occurs due to knowledge spillovers that increase domestic competition, reduce price and raise welfare of the licensee country. Despite this theoretical underpinning, domestic imitation in some developing countries is often acquiesced so long as it does not discourage foreign innovation. In the light of substantial business losses of US (Doane, 1994) .
This paper examines a foreign inventor's choices of two licensing schemesper unit royalty and fixed fee. In particular, the foreign licensor decides the quality of licensed technology when the domestic country does not implement perfect intellectual property protection for foreign technology. 3 In the present context of licensing, the domestic licensee acquires foreign technology in terms of its level of technological advancement. The closer the licensed technology level approximates its "state-of-the-art" (or the frontier) one, the better the quality. We study quality choice as the foreign licensor's selection for a particular grade of technical skills. We show, for both a weak and a strong patenting system in the domestic country, that a foreign licensor, under the fixed fee scheme, always transfer the "state-of-the-art" technology to the domestic licensee when the efficiency of such transfer is sufficiently high. We further show that fixed fee emerges as the equilibrium licensing scheme when both the transfer of his technology is relatively efficient and the licensee is sufficiently cost competitive in the domestic market, and that royalty licensing prevails otherwise. We also investigate the welfare implications of domestic patenting system for the foreign innovator's licensing policy. And we show that welfare in the licensor country need not unambiguously rise with a stronger patenting system in the licensee country when, in particular, such patenting system in place is sufficiently lax.
The novelty of our paper is that domestic patenting system impacts on the foreign inventor's licensing decisions through endogenous quality choice. 4 We argue, in addition to the strategic effects on host market competition, that there exist tradeoffs while deciding the licensing modes. We investigate the role that per unit royalty 5 plays, in particular, under weak domestic patenting regime in facilitating the endogenous choice of an exact quality level of foreign licensed technology (cf. Vishwasrao, 2007; Amir et al., 2011; Colombo and Filippini, 2016) . This paper, however, is not the first to explore the quality of licensed technology in a licensing agreement. This formulation is closest to Rockett (1990) who considers that a licensor can choose from his patent a particular vintage of the technological profile and the structure of payment (i.e., licensing scheme).
This paper differs from previous works in three aspects. First, our paper marks a subtle distinction between the quality choice of technology and process innovation.
6
Process innovation does not involve a payment from the competing firms. And if it is subsequently used for production, e.g., in a cost reduction manner, by the licensee, the quality being transferred from the licensor captures specifically the impact on the extent to which the licensee's cost is reduced. Our handling of this issue departs from the general setup in which the nature of licensed technology is a cost-reducing one".
7 Second, this model links directly the quality of licensed technology to the efficiencyadjusted technology transfer cost that is borne by the licensor, while Rockett (1990) 4 approximates "costly transfer" to the extreme case of "no imitation" of technology, Mukherjee and Tsai (2015) consider costly transfer which involves both a fixed and an adjustment cost in transferring technology, and Yang et al. (2016) examines optimal licensing schemes under Nash bargaining setting without integral linkages of technology quality to the cost of its transfer. And third, the present model considers that the patenting system in the licensee country is exogenously given and directly affects in a multiplicative manner the licensee's marginal cost ex post licensing, while Yang et al. (2016, pp. 240-241) consider endogenous domestic IPRs regime in the licensee country and separate, in an additive manner, the spillovers effect (which arises from the different strengths of IPRs in the licensee country) from the quality effect (which holds when different grades of foreign technology directly affect the licensee's cost).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 discusses the main results and their implications. And Section 4 concludes.
The basic model
We consider a world economy with two countries, foreign and domestic. Each country has one firm, denoted by 1 and 2, respectively. Assume that firm 1 is foreign and firm 2 domestic. In the domestic market, the two firms compete a la Cournot with a homogeneous product. Firm 1 holds patents for its technology profile that is captured by a range of marginal cost over [0, c] suggests that there are costs involved in setting enforceable contact terms and shifting codified knowledge when, in particular, the licensed technologies require further modification in accordance with the licensee's technological capacity.
Benchmark
Before studying the firm's interactions under licensing, we first consider the profits of the firms under no licensing. This allows us to establish the reservation payoffs as the benchmark for the licensing contract.
9 It is well documented that technology licensing requires significant amount of transaction costs (Teece, 1976; Taylor, 1993; Yang and Maskus, 2009). Under no licensing, the marginal costs of firms 1 and 2 are, respectively, 0 and (
To ensure interior solution of the licensing game, we restrict our analysis to 2
so that the firms always produce positive outputs.
Fixed-fee licensing under WP and SP
We first consider the case of a fixed-fee licensing. Under WP, for any technology of quality [0, ] sc   , competition in the output stage gives, respectively, the equilibrium profit of firm 1 and firm 2 as
(1 2 2 ) 9
where F is the fixed-fee charged by firm 1. 10 Clearly, the licensee (firm 2) accepts the licensing contract provided that the equilibrium fixed-fee being charged leaves non-negative rent for participation, i.e., 
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The SPE outcome of quality for the licensor's technology under fixed-fee licensing is 2 10 9 10
where the denominator 9 10 0   is obtained from the second-order condition. This condition ensures that Equation (5) is concave in s, which allows us to bring out the main message and analytical simplicity in the present analysis.
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Proposition 1 summarizes foreign firm's licensing decision under fixed-fee licensing in the presence of weak patenting system in the licensee country. 12 Intuitively, the strength of domestic IPRs system ( 1   ) impacts on the licensor's cost advantage against that of the licensee and, therefore, the rent accrued to the licensor under fixed-fee licensing. For any 11 Elsewhere, we explicit investigate the case of 0 10 9    and show that the licensor's profit is convex in its choice of technology quality (see the discussion in Mukherjee and Tsai (2015, p. 68) ). We sketch, in Table 1 , the equilibrium quality of licensed technology ( 13 The authors thank an anonymous referee for suggesting a graphical presentation with numerical example for better presentation of the results. Proof. For similar derivation, see Mukherjee and Tsai (2015, pp. 67-8) . Table 2 summarizes the equilibrium quality of licensed technology ( (2016), we note the following differences: foreign licensor solely incurs the cost of technology transfer, which is an efficiency-adjusted (quadratic) function of technology quality (s), while technology transfer in Colombo and Filippini (2016) relates directly with total output (p. 50). In line with the interpretation of  in the present model, if we interpret the technology parameter k in Colombo and Filippini (2016, pp. 50, 66) as an inverse measurement of the quality of technology subsequent to its innovation, then their characterization suggests that an inside innovator's total production cost falls with a higher technology quality (i.e., a smaller value of k).
Royalty licensing
We now examine foreign licensor's decision under royalty licensing. The licensing game under per-unit royalty scheme is summarized as follow. Foreign licensor first chooses the quality of licensed technology. Given the chosen quality, foreign licensor proposes the domestic licensee a royalty contract specifying the per-unit royalty rate and the quality. The licensee accepts this royalty contract if it is not worse off than no licensing, and rejects otherwise. The two firms finally compete in the domestic output market. Notice that foreign licensor (firm 1) cannot collect royalty for the licensee's (firm 2's) production since imitation is possible under weak domestic patenting, it follows that royalty licensing can be implemented only under SP, and that it is not feasible under WP.
To find the SPE outcome of optimal quality of licensed technology, we first solve, under royalty licensing, for the equilibrium output in the market. It is easy to verify that the equilibrium profit of firm 1 and 2, respectively, is 
Given the strong patenting system in the licensee country, foreign firm 1 decides the quality [0, ] sc  of its technology for solving Equation (7) 
Finally, given the equilibrium royalty obtained in Equation (9) 
Substituting (9) into (10) In Section 3, we shall compare and study the conditions under which fixed fee licensing or royalty licensing can emerge as an equilibrium scheme. We investigate foreign firm 1's choices of the licensing scheme with reference to its profit under WP and SP in the licensee country, respectively. And we also study the welfare implications for foreign firm's licensing choices of the domestic patenting systems.
To this end, we restrict our discussion to any c and  such that
under which both licensing schemes take place (cf. Propositions 1 and 2).
The Main Results
Domestic IPRs system and the equilibrium licensing schemes
A qualitative comparison of the results contained, respectively, in Proposition 1, ; and under fixed-fee licensing, 0
. We note, under WP in the licensee country, that royalty licensing scheme is not an equilibrium strategy for the licensor due to possible imitation. Hence, we restrict our comparison of the two schemes under SP. Nonetheless, this key feature of our model justifies our analysis into fixed fee licensing and royalty licensing, in contrast to Mukherjee and Tsai (2015) and others. Our consideration of possible imitation taking place in the licensee country with weak IPRs system implies that a general model of two-part tariff licensing scheme collapses into a fixed-fee scheme. This consideration of linking domestic IPRs system with royalty licensing scheme through imitation allows for separation of our model from other previous ones. Consequently, royalty licensing and its applicability can serve as an indicator of the domestic patenting regime in the licensee country.
Equilibrium firm profits under two licensing schemes
For any domestic patenting system in the licensee country, Propositions 1 and 2 and Corollary 1 suggest that net profit of foreign licensor (firm 1) and domestic licensee (firm 2) under fixed-fee licensing is, respectively, given by
Using Proposition 2, it is easy to show, under royalty licensing, that the net profit of firm 1 and 2 is, respectively, given by Intuitively, even though a strong patenting in the licensee country may safeguard the licensor's business interests, the licensor's decisions rest upon the tradeoffs between his cost advantage against that of the licensee and the burden of technology transfer costs, which, in turn, fall with a higher level of efficiency. Using Equations (12c), it is evident, under fixed-fee licensing, that the licensee (firm 2) secures a higher profit in the presence of weak domestic patenting regime, and that the licensee's profit under fixed-fee licensing in the presence of strong domestic IPRs equals to that is obtained under royalty (cf. Equation (12c) and (13c)). Notice, however, that a weak domestic IPRs system prevents the licensor from engaging in royalty licensing. It is, therefore, illegitimate to compare the licensee's equilibrium profit under royalty to that is established under fixed-fee in the presence of weak domestic patenting regime. In order to bring out the main message of our analysis, we focus on the implication of strong vs. weak domestic IPRs system in the licensee country for the welfare in the licensor country. Proposition 4 below summarizes our analysis for the impact of domestic patenting system on foreign welfare. 
Conclusion
We investigate the impact of domestic patenting regime on a foreign licensor's decisions over technology quality and optimal licensing scheme, in contrast to the early patenting literature wherein welfare implications of patenting have been the focal point. While attempting to contribute to the extant literature, we examine licensing decision with endogenous choice over the quality of licensed technology.
We consider its closeness to the "state-of-the-art" level as the quality of licensed technology. We use the strength of domestic patenting systems in the licensee country 19 This is evident from the unambiguously negative impact on licensor's output of a lax domestic IPRs system, i.e., 0 ) ( 9 For the possible avenue of future research, it is worth emphasizing that interesting insights can be provided to the extant literature as to whether quality choice of the licensed technology can be functioned as a cost-reducing technology 20 or whether new result can be obtained if it is alternatively formulated as a demand enhancing element 21 , despite that royalties is not directly associated with price in Colombo and Filippini (2016) and our paper focuses on the endogenous quality choice for any given strength of the domestic IPRs system. Equations (12b) and (13b) To prove the result contained in Proposition 3, we sketch our proof by contradiction and proceed in three steps.
Proof. First, given the SPE outcome of (5) and (6), we differentiate 
